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• Brookhaven National Laboratories (BNL)
• commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
• device under test (DUT)
• Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
• field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• integrated circuits (ICs)
• intellectual property (IP)
• Joint Electron Devices Council (JEDEC)
• Joint Test Action Group JTAG 1149.1 (JTAG)
• power-on-reset (POR)
• Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW)
• single event burnout (SEB)
• single event effects (SEE) 
• single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
• single event transient (SET)
• Single Event Upset Test Facility (SEUTF)
• single-event latch-up (SEL)
• test access port (TAP)
• windowed shift register (WSR)
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Abstract
• Electronic parts (integrated circuits) have grown 
in complexity such that determining all failure 
modes and risks from single particle event 
testing is impossible.
• In this presentation, the authors will present 
why this is so and provide some realism on 
what this means.
4
It’s all about understanding actual risks
and not making assumptions.
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Introduction
• Device complexity has increased the challenges related 
to radiation single event effects (SEE) testing.
– Obtaining appropriate test coverage and understanding of 
the response of billion-transistor commercial devices, for 
example, are a concern for every tester.
• This is akin to test vector coverage – have we stimulated 
sufficient nodes (or states) during our SEE test to understand 
risk properly?
• We present three tenets for SEE testing to consider:
– Tenet 1: All SEE test data are “good” data;
– Tenet 2: Not all test sets/methods are appropriate or 
complete; and,
– Tenet 3: Not all interpretation and analysis of SEE data are 
accurate.
• Each of these tenets will be discussed in turn with two 
related technical diatribes included.
5
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at the 2015 Government Microcircuits Applications & Critical Technologies Conference (GOMAC) Tech, 
St. Louis, MO, March 23-26, 2015.
Diatribe 1: SEFIs – Definitions
• JEDEC JESD89A* Definition
– “A soft error that causes the component to reset, lock-
up, or otherwise malfunction in a detectable way, but 
does not require power cycling of the device (off and 
back on) to restore operability, unlike single-event 
latch-up (SEL), or result in permanent damage as in 
single event burnout (SEB).”
• An example is an SEU in a control register changing 
operational modes of a device.
• Modern integrated circuits (ICs) are not that 
straightforward (see next chart)
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*Joint Electron Devices Council (JEDEC) -
Measurement and Reporting of Alpha Particle and
Terrestrial Cosmic Ray-Induced Soft Errors in Semiconductor Devices
(note: soft errors are terrestrial version of single event upsets (SEUs))
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Diatribe 1 – SEFIs?
• Are these SEFIs?
– An SEU in hidden circuitry
• May not change apparent device operation, but is 
observed via changes in power consumption (power 
cycle may be required to recover),
– A single event transient (SET) in a power-on-reset 
(POR) circuit  that power cycles/resets the device 
• Problem clears itself, but there is down time and to-be-
determined operating state after recovery,
– An SEU that latches in a redundant (weak or flawed) 
row/column in a memory array
• May not be recoverable by power reset, or
– An SEU in a security block
• Device may continue working, but user’s ability to 
change modes may be disabled.
• We’d say YES!
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Diatribe 1: SEFI – The Term
• Originally coined in the mid-1990s by Gary Swift 
(then at Jet Propulsion Laboratories) to 
describe a class of single event upsets (SEUs) 
(or a propagated SET) that causes a functional 
“hiccup” to occur and may be “soft” (can be 
cleared be reprogramming, restarting, or other 
non-power cycling means) or “hard” (requires 
power cycle). 
– Operational changes would be included as well as 
those “non-operational” changes like current creep.
– This is a more general description than the JEDEC 
definition.
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A SEFI Example (1)
• The figure below illustrates a step load increase 
in the power consumption (supply current) that 
occurred during an SEU test on a field 
programmable gate array (FPGA) device (Katz, et 
al).
– Single event latchup (SEL) is often assumed when 
power increased as observed.
– Device configuration also was altered during the event.
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A SEFI Example (2)
• SEU event was associated with the built in test 
circuit (Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) Joint Test Action Group JTAG 1149.1 
(JTAG) Test Access Port (TAP) controller as 
illustrated below.
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A SEFI Example (3)
• The bottom line is that the observational line 
between a SEFI and SEL can be very blurry.
• Without a true understanding of the device’s 
operation (for both that which is accessible to 
the user and that which isn’t) as well as a 
maximization of visibility by the test set/method, 
understanding and classifying an event may be 
problematic.
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Tenet 1: The Data is Always “Good”
• In short, data is just data.
– It is what was observed and captured during an SEE 
test.
– Now the question becomes are the data captured 
complete, appropriate, and interpreted correctly?
• Think of the questions this brings into play:
– Have all data points been captured? (adequate and 
reliable data capture),
– Was the test prognostic enough to gather the right 
range of data (think of the simple SET capture from an 
operational amplifier – was the minimum pulse 
width/amplitude sensitivity of your oscilloscope set 
appropriately)? (appropriate test set granularity); or,
– Have all the right test vehicles been used to generate 
that data? (adequate test circuits/operation)
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The point is simple: the data are correct, but there’s either not enough of it or 
insufficient granularity of information.
The simple takeaway is that testing requires a look far below the surface…
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Tenet 2: The Test (1)
• The first complication comes from the way the 
device under test (DUT) is tested and the way 
data capture was performed.
• The general idea is to focus on prognostic testing 
– ensuring that your test design is inquisitive 
enough to capture all available information on an 
event.
• We will define design visibility as ensuring that 
the interface between what the DUT is doing and 
how the test system is operating is adequate to 
capture all relevant event information.
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Tenet 2: The Test (2)
• While this presentation isn’t a “how-to-test” 
document, it does recommend a thought process 
on what needs to be thoroughly considered in 
advance of test.
• An example would be having a high-speed logic 
string, such as a shift register, with inadequate 
output buffer performance that limits operation to 
10% of the frequency capability.
– In a case like this, choice of output buffer type along 
with a concept such as a windowed shift register (WSR) 
approach [Berg, et al] would allow for a proper operation 
and data capture.
• Bottom line: know how the testing was done and 
the level of completeness and granularity of data 
captured.
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Tenet 3: The Analysis
• The real output of any SEE test campaign is not 
only the ability to determine rates for space 
usage, but also the error signatures of the events.
• This is the key to understanding the risk beyond 
the SEE rates and to provide the system 
designers the information to properly design 
mitigation or fault tolerance approaches.
• The simple way of viewing this is that all SEU 
events that cause SEFIs are not created equal:
– They have different circuit responses and capturing and 
diagnosing them can be a challenge.
– One SEFI may change the operating mode, while 
another may cause a current increase.
15
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Diatribe 2: Limiting cross-sections (1)
• The theory is pretty straightforward: 
– Just because an event is not observed during a SEE test 
run doesn’t rule out the potential that the next particle 
will cause the event (or a different event).
• SEE is known to be a Markov process in that past 
performance is not necessarily an indicator what 
happens next.
– One then assumes that the next particle will cause an 
event.
– The limiting cross-section is then usually designated as 
1/(fluence of the test run, i.e., the total number of 
particles/cm2 accumulated during that run).
16
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Diatribe 2: Limiting cross-sections (2)
• A simple example was documented in 1998 by 
LaBel, et al.
– Proton SEE tests  were performed with a sample size of 
3 and a proton test fluence of 1×1010 p/cm2
– A specific SEFI condition was not observed (row/column 
errors).
– The project utilizing this device did not understand that 
this implied a limiting cross-section, as opposed to a 
zero cross-section or immunity to the effect.
– They flew 1000 samples of this device and observed this 
SEFI in flight.
– A re-test with 100 parts and a higher proton fluence 
confirmed this rare event and device sensitivity.
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In cases of billion transistor devices, the probability of stimulating all 
possible error signatures is statistically zero for a typical test 
campaign.  Thus, the best we can try to do is provide the limits for 
other error types not observed
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Caveat Emptor!
• The figure below is from the 1992 IEEE Radiation Effects Data 
Workshop (REDW) record (LaBel, et al.)
• To summarize what was presented,
– A system level test of an INTEL 80386 processor and several 
peripherals was performed at Brookhaven National Laboratories 
(BNL) Single Event Upset Test Facility (SEUTF).
– The data were for a representative test run and interpreted as 
“microlatchup” – a series of SEL events that caused a step-like 
increase with each event in the power supply current 
consumption.
– However, the device continued to function during the test run 
even with the increases.
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Mea Culpa!
• Realistically, more diagnostics were needed to 
determine if these really were SEL events and 
not possibly caused by SEU hits to hidden logic 
or bus contention or another SEFI event.
• Even over twenty years ago, device complexity 
and understanding should have been better 
explored. 
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Discussion
• The realistic implications are different depending on 
whether the device is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or 
custom-designed for radiation tolerance..
– For COTS, you will be dealing with unknowns and limitations, 
hence capturing as many error signatures as possible 
provides the most useful information.
• It’s what the designers need to build appropriate mitigation into 
their systems.
– For custom design, you should be able to predict error 
signatures as long as there aren’t intellectual property (IP) 
blocks of unknown design (black box designs).
• Thus, tests here are usually more about statistics to meet SEU 
rates or threshold levels.
• That is, unless unexpected SEFI events occur.
• Devices like FPGAs are afflicted with both implications:
– Custom designs are created, but there’s also manufacturer-embedded 
IP and hidden functions that require detailed error signature capture.
– Double the challenge!
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Summary
• While far from a complete treatise on testing, we 
have provided some caveats in reviewing a 
device’s SEE performance based on collected 
data.
• The level of understanding of the device’s 
internal workings as well as the limitations of the 
test setup, allow proper risk-based analyses to be 
performed on the collected SEE data.
– It’s not just event rates, but event signatures and 
interpretation!
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